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The Fiscal Implications of Inadequate Retirement Savings in Maine 
 
Philip Trostel1 
February 13, 2017 
 
Introduction and Summary 
This study estimates the future costs to taxpayers from new retirees in Maine and in the United 
States as a whole (and there are unreported estimates for each of the other 49 states).  As in 
previous reports of this type,2 “new retirees” refers to people turning age 65 in coming years.  
The projections are for the 15 years from 2018 through 2032. 
Inadequate savings for retirement creates fiscal costs due to increased elderly reliance on 
public assistance (mostly in Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income, Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program, and housing assistance).  An aging workforce moving into retirement is 
increasing public-assistance spending on the elderly.  Moreover, savings for retirement has 
been declining in recent years, which will further exacerbate the problem.  But the fiscal burden 
from the retirement-age population does not have to grow.   Simulations show that increasing 
retirement income through greater preretirement savings can substantially reduce the need for 
taxpayer contributions for public assistance. 
Total means-tested public-assistance spending on the age 65 to 79 population is estimated to 
be $37 billion nationally in 2016 (this does not include Social Security).  Most (76%) of this fiscal 
cost is federally financed.  In Maine, public-assistance spending on the retirement-age 
population was $164 million, with about $28 million of the fiscal cost financed within the state. 
                                                          
1 I am very grateful to Catherine Reilly deLutio for providing excellent research assistance. 
2 Jay Goodliffe, Erik Krisle, Sterling Peterson, and Sven Wilson (2015) “The Cost or Retiring Poor: Cost to Taxpayers 
of Utahns Retiring Poor,” Notalys LLC. 
Karen Zurlo, Serah Shin, and Hyungsoo Kim (2015). “Retiring Poor in New Jersey: The Projected Expenditures on 
Government Programs for Older Adults,” AARP. 
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Continuing demographic change (i.e., baby boomers reaching retirement age) will cause these 
costs to rise substantially.  The U.S. retirement-age population is projected to be 39% greater in 
2032 than in 2016.  Maine’s retirement age population is projected to increase 30% between 
2016 and 2032. 
Compounding this, asset accumulation among the U.S. preretirement-age population has not 
kept pace with economic growth.  In fact, preretirement asset accumulation has more than just 
stagnated in recent years; it declined between 2006 and 2014.  Although the recession, bear 
market, and slump in housing prices were contributing factors, they do not fully explain the 
downward trend.  Moreover, the downward trend in asset accumulation has been particularly 
severe in the lower half of the wealth distribution; that is, low- and middle-income households 
who would most benefit from better opportunities to save for retirement.  
After accounting for these trends, the national cost of public assistance on the retirement-age 
population is projected to be $86 billion in 2032 (i.e., 2.4 times higher than in 2016, even 
without any inflation).  Maine’s fiscal cost is projected to increase to $362 million in 2032, with 
state’s share growing to $61 million (2.2 times greater than in 2016). 
The fiscal cost from the retirement-age population does not have to grow to such a magnitude, 
though.   Increasing retirement income through greater preretirement savings can substantially 
reduce taxpayer contributions for public assistance. 
Fiscal Costs of Recent Retirees 
The fiscal costs of recent retirees in each state can be estimated well using recent individual-
level data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the 
Current Population Survey (CPS).3  These data are collected in March of the survey year, but the 
dollar amounts are for the previous calendar year. 
The CPS is a fairly large national sample, each year averaging about 18,000 observations of 
individuals age 65 to 79.  For state-level analyses, though, the CPS samples can be too small to 
produce reliable estimates.  A small state such as Maine averages fewer than 300 observations 
in the 65-79 age group each year, and some states have even smaller subsamples.  For this 
reason, five years of data are pooled together to increase the sample size.  All dollar values are 
converted to 2016 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
Until the 2015 survey (i.e., 2014 amounts) the CPS contained the estimated insurance value of 
Medicaid to individuals.  The Census Bureau has stopped reporting those estimates, though: 
“Due to security concerns, the Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services has limited the 
                                                          
3 Sarah Flood, Miriam King, Steven Ruggles, and J. Robert Warren (2015). Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, 
Current Population Survey: Version 4.0, [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 
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availability of data used to update the market value of Medicaid.”  Given the importance of 
Medicaid in this project, data for years 2009-13 are used in the subsequent analysis.4 
The first columns of Tables 1 and 2 report the average5 means-tested transfer payments (both 
cash and the dollar value of in-kind benefits) received by retirement-age individuals in the 
United States and in Maine.  The subsequent columns show the average amounts across 
categories of “retirement” income, which is not a well-defined term.  In this report the measure 
is income from Social Security, pensions, annuities, IRAs, survivor’s benefits, and the imputed 
return on home equity.  This somewhat broad measure of retirement income predicts levels of 
means-tested transfer payments better than narrower measures.  Social Security is nearly 48% 
of the measure, on average.  The imputed return to home equity is 25% of the retirement 
income measure.6 
 
Average retirement income in Maine is slightly (3.4%) below the national average, but 
retirement income in Maine is not distributed as widely as nationally.  That is, despite the lower 
average retirement income in Maine, there are relatively fewer instances of particularly low 
retirement income in Maine.  Nationally, 10% of the retirement-age population have retirement 
incomes below $5,620 (despite “retirement income” being measured broadly by including the 
imputed return on home equity).  In Maine, the bottom decile of retirement incomes is below 
$7,668.  The bottom four decile cutoffs in Maine are above the national cutoffs, and the median 
retirement income in Maine is only 0.8% below the U.S. median. 
                                                          
4 Average values of Medicaid can be constructed for 2014-15, but in this analysis they would not be sufficiently 
comparable to earlier years.  To be specific, the CPS Medicaid values in 2009-13 distinguish between aged and non-
aged, which differ considerably, and cannot be constructed in later years. 
5 Actually, the “averages” in this report are the means after weighting the observations by their inverse sampling 
probabilities. 
6 Counting the imputed return on home equity as income may seem unusual.  But including it in the measure of 
income substantially improves the prediction of public assistance received (it raises the R2 by 65%). 
Table 1
Estimated Annual Means-Tested Public Assistance per Elderly - United States
(Average for Ages 65-79 during 2009-13 in 2016 $)
mean less $5,000 $10,000 $15,000 $20,000 more
than to to to to than
"Retirement" Income $25,827 $5,000 $9,999 $14,999 $19,999 $24,999 $24,999
Total Public Assistance $987 $3,697 $2,210 $1,491 $724 $430 $270
Medicaid $520 $1,498 $1,147 $832 $422 $276 $195
Supplemental Security Income $181 $1,221 $342 $137 $98 $39 $20
Food Stamps $143 $431 $321 $249 $122 $78 $38
Housing Subsidies $103 $436 $333 $215 $43 $8 $1
Other $40 $111 $67 $59 $38 $30 $17
N 85,272 7,866 7,758 12,054 13,715 10,547 33,332
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Medicaid is the largest public-assistance program that the elderly receive both nationally (53% 
of the total) and in Maine (45%).  The dollar value of Medicaid is measured as its “insurance 
value,” that is, its actuarial value based on age (child, adult, or aged), state, and disability status.  
It is not measured as its usage of public funds for Medicaid. 
The other important forms of public assistance for the elderly are Supplemental Security 
Income, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, also known as Food Stamps), and 
the value of federal housing assistance.  The small “other” category in Tables 1 and 2 consists of 
dependents’ school lunch subsidies, energy assistance, Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), other cash public assistance, and 
Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC).  The reason 
Maine’s other category is larger than for the U.S. is its larger amount of energy assistance 
(heating subsidies).7 
Most public assistance is administered through states but financed by the federal government.  
Supplemental Security Income, SNAP, AFDC, and TANF are federal programs.  The CPS measure 
of the housing subsidy is the federal program.  Medicaid, school lunches, and energy assistance 
are partly state financed.  Data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services indicates 
that in 2012-13 (earlier years are atypical in that they contain substantial extra federal 
contributions from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act), states contributed 42% of 
total Medicaid financing; and in Maine, 36% of Medicaid was state funding. 
Determining states’ shares of school-lunch and energy assistance has always been complicated 
by different state and federal fiscal years and accounting practices, but it has become more 
difficult in recent years because the Consolidated Federal Funds Report was discontinued in 
2010.  Based on the available historical data, it is assumed that all energy assistance is federally 
                                                          
7 The CPS also has a measure of “educational assistance” that includes government financial aid such as Pell 
Grants, but it includes employer contributions for education and scholarships and grants from non-governmental 
sources.  The amount is quite small (less than 1% of total public assistance) among the retirement-age population. 
Table 2
Estimated Annual Means-Tested Public Assistance per Elderly - Maine
(Average for Ages 65-79 during 2009-13 in 2016 $)
mean less $5,000 $10,000 $15,000 $20,000 more
"Retirement" than to to to to than
Income $24,956 $5,000 $9,999 $14,999 $19,999 $24,999 $24,999
Total Public Assistance $841 $2,811 $2,214 $1,282 $755 $700 $185
Medicaid $377 $486 $707 $604 $500 $428 $136
Supplemental Security Income $134 $1,171 $602 $46 $0 $58 $0
Food Stamps $164 $365 $488 $332 $124 $145 $30
Housing Subsidies $95 $588 $360 $159 $38 $1 $0
Other $70 $201 $57 $141 $94 $68 $18
N 1,541 103 141 235 273 198 591
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financed.8  If it is assumed that states only contribute their minimums mandated by federal law, 
states finance 28% of school lunches nationally, and Maine contributes 27%.  It is also assumed 
that cash assistance from the category AFDC, TANF, and other is all federal, and cash assistance 
in the very small remaining category is funded by state and local governments. 
Given these assumptions, nationally $233 of the $987 (24%) in means-tested transfer payments 
per retirement-age population is financed by states.  In Maine, $143 of the $841 (17%) in public 
assistance per elderly is not financed federally. 
Interpolating Census Bureau population projections indicates that there were 37,214,000 
Americans age 65 to 79 in 2016.9  Combining this with the estimates in Table 1 indicates that 
their total public assistance cost taxpayers nearly $37 billion.  The federal government 
component was $28 billion.  Interpolating the population projections from the Maine Office of 
Policy and Management indicate that there were 195,343 Maine residents age 65 to 79 in 
2016.10  The estimates in Table 2 suggest their total public assistance cost taxpayers more than 
$164 million, with $28 million financed within the state. 
As one would expect, those with the lowest retirement incomes generally receive the largest 
means-tested transfer payments.  The relationship between total public assistance received 
and retirement income is nonlinear.  Public assistance declines rapidly with income at the 
bottom of retirement income distribution, but then declines increasingly gradually through the 
middle of income distribution.  This is shown in Table 3, which reports the average level of 
means-tested transfer payment across U.S. retirement income deciles.   
For the subsequent analysis it is necessary to quantify the relationship between transfer 
payments and retirement income.  Moreover, the relationship needs to be quantified linearly.  
Using a nonlinear relationship would require knowing or at least approximating the entire 
distribution of retirement incomes, because the effect on public assistance could differ at every 
level of income.  To keep the analysis manageable a linear relationship needs to be estimated, 
but the actual relationship is decidedly nonlinear.  After experimenting with various 
possibilities, a linear spline is estimated over U.S. retirement-income quintiles.  This procedure 
estimates different linear relationships between five groups of retirement income. 
                                                          
8 Nationally in 2009-10, the states’ share of energy assistance was about 7%.  During those years, federally-
financed “leverage awards” encouraged states to supplement LIHEAP funds with non-federal resources, but those 
incentives stopped after 2010.  Given the already low leverage rate and the elimination of federal financial 
incentives, it is assumed that state-funded energy assistance after 2010 is negligible.   
9 U.S. Census Bureau (2014). “Projections of the Population by Sex and Age for the United States: 2015 to 2060,” 
NP2014-T9. 
10 Maine Office of Policy and Management (2016). Maine State and County Population Projections 2024. 
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A linear spline regression estimated over smaller groups would more precisely estimate the 
nonlinear relationship, but it would also increase the risk of “overfitting” the data.  That is, the 
sample size is not large enough to prevent outliers from creating implausible blips in the 
estimated relationship between public assistance and retirement income.  The problem is 
particularly severe at the state level.  Estimating a linear spline over five quintiles appears to be 
the best compromise between estimating the nonlinearity precisely but without overfitting it 
too much. 
The estimated linear splines are illustrated in Figure 1.  For the U.S., the estimated intercept 
(i.e., the amount of public assistance for someone with no retirement income) is $4,047.  Public 
assistance is estimated to fall by: 22¢ per dollar of retirement income over the first quintile 
(income up to $10,609), 16¢ per dollar over the second quintile ($17,493), 3¢ per dollar over 
the middle quintile ($24,598), 1¢ per dollar over the fourth quintile, and zero over the top 
quintile.  The estimated intercept in Maine is $3,712.  Public assistance in Maine is estimated to 
fall by: 21¢ per dollar of retirement income in the bottom quintile, 11¢ per dollar in the second 
quintile, 3¢ per dollar in the third quintile, 4¢ per dollar in the fourth quintile,11 and zero in the 
top quintile. 
                                                          
11 The slightly higher number in the fourth quintile than the third quintile (although the difference is not 
statistically significant) is an example of the overfitting described earlier.  In this instance it is too small to have an 
appreciable effect in the subsequent analysis. 
Table 3
Estimated Annual Means-Tested Public Assistance over U.S. Retirement Income Deciles
(Ages 65-79 during 2009-13 in 2016 $)
United States Maine
Average Average
Public Assistance N Public Assistance N
1st Decile (less than $5,620) $3,600 8,522 $2,587 115
2nd Decile ($5,620 - $10,609) $2,215 8,532 $2,342 160
3rd Decile ($10,609 - $14,209) $1,508 8,534 $1,112 163
4th Decile ($14,209 - $17,493) $802 8,521 $945 166
5th & 6th Deciles ($17,493 - $24,598) $531 17,054 $641 332
7th & 8th Deciles ($24,598 - $36,062) $329 17,055 $293 326
9th & 10th Deciles ($36,062 and greater) $216 17,054 $122 279
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Projections of New Retirees 
Until 2005, the U.S. Census Bureau created population projections for every state.  Since then 
each state is responsible for constructing its own projections.  However, there is significant 
inconsistency in the data across the states.  Each state has its own policies and methods for 
creating population projections.  Thus, the estimates vary considerably by methodology, cohort 
definitions, and date.  For instance, Delaware released projections in 2016 for single-age 
cohorts every year through 2050.  In contrast, South Carolina's most recent publicly available 
projections of population by age group were released in 2005 and are for cohorts spanning as 
many as 20 years of age every ten years through 2030.  States’ methodologies also vary, 
especially in regard to projecting/forecasting migration.  Delaware bases net migration on 
forecasts of state job growth, Kansas holds net migration constant, and Mississippi gradually 
tapers off net migration. 
Considering these inconsistencies (as well as avoiding having to interpolate numbers at each 
age from five-year age groupings), we generate projections for all fifty states with a consistent 
methodology using data from the American Community Survey (ACS).12  Each observation in the 
ACS carries a sampling weight, i.e., the number of people in the population that each person in 
the sample represents.  Thus, it is straightforward to estimate the number of people at each 
age in the year of the survey.  The most recent year of the ACS is 2015. 
Although the ACS is a large sample, the age-state cells can be rather small.  For example, in 
recent years Maine has an average of 218 observations in the relevant cells.  Thus, the 
estimates of the population at each age are not precise for small states.  To reduce this problem 
the most recent five years of data (2011-15) are pooled. 
                                                          
12 Steven Ruggles, Katie Genadek, Ronald Goeken, Josiah Grover, and Matthew Sobek (2015). Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series: Version 6.0, [dataset]. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota. 
$0
$500
$1,000
$1,500
$2,000
$2,500
$3,000
$3,500
$4,000
$4,500
$0 $10,000 $20,000 $30,000 $40,000 $50,000
Figure 1
Estimated Relationship between Public Assistance
and Retirement Income
United States Maine
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To project the numbers into the future, survival probabilities need to be applied to the 
population estimates generated from the ACS data.  For example, someone age 58 in the 2013 
sample would turn age 65 in 2000.  The probability of that occurring is the survival probability 
of 58-year-old reaching age 59 times the probability of a 59-year-old reaching age 60 times… 
the probability of a 64-year-old reaching 65.  These survival probabilities can be constructed 
from death probabilities in U.S. life tables.  The latest life tables are from 2012.13  Thus, the 
population projections are the sample-weighted observed numbers at each age times the 
relevant multiplicative survival probability to each future year. 
The implicit assumption underlying this relatively simple approach is that there is no net 
migration in the relevant age cohorts (i.e., those approaching retirement age).  Net migration 
for older cohorts is relatively small.14 15 Moreover, projecting net migration decades into the 
future is tenuous at best (extrapolating trends from a few years of data runs into the same 
“overfitting” problem discussed earlier – a few outliers can create obviously distorted 
projections). 
Tables 4 shows the estimated number of residents turning age 65 in 2018 through 2032 in the 
U.S. and Maine.  The numbers appear to be fairly close to official estimates.  Both the U.S. 
Census Bureau national estimates and Office of Policy and Management Maine estimates are 
reported in five-year age cohorts and in five-year intervals.  Interpolating these estimates yields 
the numbers shown in Figures 2 and 3 along with estimates constructed here.  The average 
difference between the estimates constructed for this report and the interpolated official 
estimates is +0.9% nationally and +1.9% in Maine.  The cumulative difference in 2032 is -5.2% 
nationally (interpolated between their 2030 and 2035 totals) and -0.02% in Maine. 
These demographic projection reported in Table 4 suggests that the U.S. retirement-age 
population (i.e., age 65-79) will be 39% greater in 2032 than in 2016.  The projection for Maine 
is for a 30% increase in the retirement-age population from 2016 to 2032. 
 
                                                          
13 Elizabeth Arias, Melonie Heron, and Jiaquan Xu. (2015). “United States Life Tables, 2012” National Vital Statistics 
Reports, V65, N8. 
14 The rate of annual immigration (from other states and abroad) in the ACS data for everyone age 21 and older 
was 2.55%.  But for those age 50-64 the immigration rate was 1.50%, and for those age 65-79 the rate was 1.28%. 
15 Maine had small net in-migration in recent years [see, e.g., Governing Data (2016). “State Migration Rates, Net 
Totals: 2011-2016.”].  Maine’s net rate of interstate migration (i.e., not including migration to or from abroad) in 
the 2011-15 ACS data for the 50-79 age group was 0.17% (1.40% interstate in-migration minus 1.23% out-
migration). 
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Table 4
Estimated Population Turning Age 65
Turning Turning
Year 65 Cumulative 65 Cumulative
2018 3,702,491 3,702,491 19,571 19,571
2019 3,769,182 7,425,281 20,381 39,707
2020 3,856,342 11,184,913 19,868 59,058
2021 3,926,966 14,960,320 19,798 78,055
2022 4,010,179 18,759,476 21,103 98,055
2023 4,024,954 22,508,880 20,461 117,074
2024 4,006,686 26,170,573 20,624 135,900
2025 4,035,448 29,786,427 20,526 154,242
2026 4,099,266 33,385,529 19,381 171,025
2027 4,053,137 36,851,458 19,831 187,831
2028 4,057,408 40,229,359 19,223 203,566
2029 4,032,577 43,483,948 18,366 217,959
2030 3,906,197 46,507,142 17,681 231,158
2031 3,705,093 49,218,591 16,545 242,687
2032 3,599,459 51,709,043 17,495 254,610
United States Maine
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Figure 2
Projected 65-Year-Olds
United States
Author's Estimates using ACS Data
Interpolated U.S. Census Bureau Estimates
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Scenarios 1 and 2 
If retirement preparation is the same for future and current cohorts, and if public assistance 
remains constant in real terms, the resulting fiscal costs of new retirees are shown in Tables 5.  
This is referred to as Scenario 1. 
The national fiscal cost under Scenario 1 exceeds $51 billion in 2032.  This is 0.77% of all 
government spending in FY 2016 – just for public assistance to those ages 65 to 79.  The states’ 
share of this cost is 0.43% of net state and local spending in FY 2016. 
 
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
Figure 3
Projected 65-Year-Olds
Maine
Author's Estimates using ACS Data
Interpolated Maine Office of Policy and Management Estimates
Table 5
Estimated Fiscal Costs from New Retirees (in 2016 $) - Scenario 1
Total Cost to Total Cost to
Year Cost States Cost Maine Govt.
2018 $3,653,530,740 $863,416,307 $16,458,172 $2,789,741
2019 $7,327,092,054 $1,731,566,315 $33,391,120 $5,659,959
2020 $11,037,008,184 $2,608,307,832 $49,663,723 $8,418,244
2021 $14,762,490,712 $3,488,728,060 $65,639,416 $11,126,203
2022 $18,511,408,193 $4,374,686,525 $82,457,963 $13,977,029
2023 $22,211,231,574 $5,249,042,885 $98,451,727 $16,688,050
2024 $25,824,503,811 $6,102,945,149 $114,283,032 $19,371,534
2025 $29,392,543,204 $6,946,157,815 $129,707,659 $21,986,084
2026 $32,944,052,119 $7,785,463,935 $143,821,434 $24,378,438
2027 $36,364,149,060 $8,593,714,277 $157,953,542 $26,773,900
2028 $39,697,382,048 $9,381,436,599 $171,186,268 $29,016,912
2029 $42,908,933,665 $10,140,402,715 $183,289,448 $31,068,460
2030 $45,892,150,157 $10,845,407,805 $194,389,307 $32,949,940
2031 $48,567,744,040 $11,477,714,347 $204,083,960 $34,593,232
2032 $51,025,263,299 $12,058,484,663 $214,110,615 $36,292,799
United States Maine
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It is probable that levels of public assistance, particularly Medicaid, will grow in real terms as 
real per capita income grows.  Thus, the estimates in Scenario 1 are unrealistically low.  Tables 6 
reports estimates of a second scenario that assumes that levels of public assistance increase 
along with increases in the standard of living.  To be specific, it assumes that real public 
assistance increases by 1.524% annually, which was the annual rate of increase in U.S. real GDP 
per capita from 1991 through 2016. 
In the more realistic Scenario 2, the national cost of public assistance to the retirement-age 
population is $65 billion by 2032 (77% more than in 2016).  The fiscal cost in Maine is $273 
million in 2032 (66% more than in 2016).  Maine’s share of the fiscal cost in 2032 is projected to 
be $46 million. 
 
Trend in Retirement Assets 
The trend in, and distribution of, asset accumulation is examined using data from the Health 
and Retirement Study (HRS).  To be more specific, the version complied by RAND is used.16  
Estimates of pension wealth constructed by Gustman et al. (2014) are also used.17  The HRS 
contains very detailed information on asset accumulation, particularly for middle-aged 
                                                          
16 RAND HRS Data, Version P. Produced by the RAND Center for the Study of Aging, with funding from the National 
Institute on Aging and the Social Security Administration. Santa Monica, CA (August 2016). 
17 Alan Gustman, Thomas Steinmeier, and Nahid Tabatabai (2014). Updated Pension Wealth Data Files in the HRS 
Panel: 1992 to 2010. 
Table 6
Estimated Fiscal Costs from New Retirees (in 2016 $) - Scenario 2
United States
Total Cost to Total Cost to
Year Cost States Cost Maine Govt.
2018 $3,765,746,336 $889,935,524 $16,963,673 $2,875,426
2019 $7,667,240,613 $1,811,951,519 $34,941,250 $5,922,713
2020 $11,725,407,837 $2,770,993,062 $52,761,345 $8,943,307
2021 $15,922,284,455 $3,762,814,937 $70,796,281 $12,000,317
2022 $20,270,027,913 $4,790,290,239 $90,291,629 $15,304,874
2023 $24,692,023,268 $5,835,313,032 $109,447,886 $18,551,953
2024 $29,146,416,822 $6,887,992,290 $128,983,732 $21,863,375
2025 $33,679,024,132 $7,959,155,322 $148,623,661 $25,192,439
2026 $38,323,794,119 $9,056,825,065 $167,307,380 $28,359,421
2027 $42,947,121,373 $10,149,427,380 $186,547,743 $31,620,757
2028 $47,598,322,306 $11,248,616,909 $205,257,343 $34,792,126
2029 $52,233,201,864 $12,343,949,308 $223,118,915 $37,819,750
2030 $56,716,115,831 $13,403,368,619 $240,237,304 $40,721,401
2031 $60,937,573,120 $14,400,999,492 $256,062,568 $43,403,860
2032 $64,996,747,658 $15,360,279,087 $272,737,322 $46,230,313
Maine
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households approaching retirement age.  Unfortunately, the dataset is not large enough to 
conduct state-specific analyses.  Thus, only national numbers are examined. 
The HRS has been conducted in waves every two years from 1992 through 2014.18  The 
estimates of pension wealth, however, are only for the waves through 2010.  All values are 
converted into 2016 dollars using the CPI. 
Two measures of total net asset accumulation are examined below.  One is the HRS measure of 
“total wealth excluding secondary residence.”  Their broadest measure of total net assets, 
“total wealth including secondary residence” would be preferable, but it is not measured in the 
1996 wave and 42% of the observations are missing in the 1994 wave.19  The two measures are 
closely correlated (their correlation coefficient is 0.987), however, and minimal information is 
lost using the slightly narrower measure that is collected consistently.  The average net value of 
their difference (i.e., the net value of secondary residence) is 4.9% of total wealth. 
The second measure examined below is the sum of pension wealth estimated by Gustman et al. 
(2014) and the HRS measure of total wealth excluding secondary residence.  Unfortunately, 
pension wealth is not available for 2012 and 2014.  Moreover, there are fewer observations of 
pension wealth (6,739 per year on average) than for other wealth (18,880 on average).  But 
changes in pension wealth appear to be too important to omit from the analysis. 
The age group examined for asset accumulation is ages 47 through 61.20  This is the age range in 
2014 of the group reaching age 65 in years 2018 through 2032.  Most of the observations in the 
65-79 cohort observed in the CPS data in 2011-2015 were in the 47-61 age range in the years 
1983 through 2007. 
Table 7 reports mean and median levels of assets for preretirement Americans since 1992.  
Despite generally increasing per capita incomes (U.S. real GDP per capita was 39% higher in 
2014 than in 1992), there has been alarmingly little increase in assets among this group.  
Indeed, average net assets have been on a downward trend since 2006.  The recession in 2007-
09 and the bear market (after controlling for inflation, both GDP per capita and the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average did not fully return to their 2006 levels until 2013) were clearly important 
contributors to this downward trend, but they do not appear to be the whole story.21  The 
downward trend persisted even after income and stock values rose. 
                                                          
18 Actually, only most of the observations were collected in these even years, but most of the waves took two, 
sometimes three, years to complete. 
19 It also would be preferable to include the HRS estimates of the implicit value of Social Security pensions, but this 
is calculated in only three of the waves (1992, 1998, and 2004). 
20 In the case of couples their ages are averaged.  Average ages 46.5 and 61.5 are rounded upwards. 
21 Average house prices also fell in 2008-12, but this does not appear to complete the story either. 
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The median levels reported in Table 7 reveal an even bleaker picture of asset accumulation 
than the averages.  That is, the mean levels somewhat mask the severe downward trend in 
asset accumulation for low-income preretirement Americans.  The distribution of assets has 
always been skewed, so it is hardly surprising that its median is below its mean.  But the 
skewness increased dramatically since 2002 and the distance between the median and mean 
has become astounding. 
In the HRS measure of net assets not including pension wealth, the median was 39% of the 
mean in 2002 (and in 1992).  In 2014, the median was 16% of the mean.22  The skewness is not 
as pronounced in the measure of net wealth including pensions, but the trend is similar.  In the 
measure including pensions, the median was nearly 61% of the mean in 2002 but only 44% in 
2010. 
The trends in asset accumulation seen in Table 7 were particularly pronounced in the bottom 
three quintiles of net assets.  Table 8 shows the bottom three quintile dividing points in net 
worth from 1992 through 2014.  In the measure of net wealth not including the value of 
pension wealth, more than 20% of middle-age Americans has a net wealth less than or equal to 
zero in 2010 and 2012! 
                                                          
22 A similar pattern is seen when using the HRS measure total wealth including secondary residence.  The 
mean/median ratio was 39% in 1992 and 2002, and was 15% in 2014. 
Table 7
Estimated Total Net Wealth for Americans Age 47 - 61 (in 2016 $)
Year Mean Median Mean Median
1992 $387,077 $150,539 $575,443 $341,710
1994 $430,303 $167,940 $608,436 $360,760
1996 $442,634 $165,793 $667,758 $373,338
1998 $458,032 $164,618 $745,728 $410,936
2000 $525,506 $178,402 $787,114 $447,680
2002 $498,680 $194,781 $766,361 $465,538
2004 $523,220 $182,959 $766,598 $457,429
2006 $573,533 $203,577 $851,981 $486,594
2008 $512,666 $170,555 $794,303 $438,810
2010 $458,169 $73,965 $716,003 $318,435
2012 $450,790 $65,857
2014 $444,966 $70,562
Average N 7,119 3,760
Not Including
Pension Wealth
Including
Pension Wealth
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The downward trend in the measure of net wealth including pension wealth may be less 
shocking at first glance, but is actually considerably larger in magnitude.  Net wealth not 
including pensions at the 20th percentile was quite low before 2002, so there is not much space 
for it to fall.  But net wealth including pensions at the 20th percentile fell by more than half 
between 2002 and 2010. 
To quantify the trend in each wealth quintile (to match with retirement income quintiles in the 
CPS data), the asset data (for ages 47 through 61) are sorted into quintiles in each year.  A 
regression equation is then estimated for each quintile.  To be specific, net wealth including 
pensions is regressed against age, the real value of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), and 
year.23  The broader measure including pension wealth is used despite losing two years of data 
because it yields somewhat more conservative estimates of a downward trend in asset 
accumulation.  Net wealth is expected to increase with age and with real stock prices. 
The results of these regressions are reported in Table 9.  The coefficients of interest are those 
on year.  Net wealth of preretirement-age Americans declined over the 1992-2010 period for all 
five quintiles, although the decline is not statistically significant for the top quintile.  Net wealth 
declines by roughly $4,000 annually for the bottom three quintiles.  In percentage terms, 
however, the decline is particularly large at the low end of the wealth distribution. 
                                                          
23 Real house prices (the Freddie Mac House Price Index adjusted by the CPI) were also initially included in the 
regression but it was generally not statistically significant (and had an unexpected negative coefficient) when other 
explanatory variables were included. 
Table 8
Bottom Three Net Wealth Quintiles for Ages 47 -61 (in 2016 $)
Year 20th Percentile 40th Percentile 60th Percentile 20th Percentile 40th Percentile 60th Percentile
1992 $27,371 $104,494 $210,412 $131,722 $259,680 $436,214
1994 $31,742 $112,635 $235,966 $139,338 $279,182 $466,114
1996 $33,255 $116,256 $233,276 $147,050 $284,316 $487,525
1998 $32,865 $113,378 $237,062 $149,084 $309,062 $523,050
2000 $39,026 $121,258 $259,102 $158,394 $333,362 $592,840
2002 $40,023 $133,545 $295,106 $166,840 $345,902 $610,501
2004 $24,903 $113,079 $279,521 $145,318 $338,331 $585,297
2006 $20,834 $118,199 $310,438 $148,999 $346,536 $625,863
2008 $15,622 $97,807 $260,849 $132,654 $311,240 $584,506
2010 $0 $36,591 $132,300 $81,102 $221,124 $430,017
2012 $0 $30,315 $117,949
2014 $203 $33,456 $122,165
Not Including Including
Pension Wealth Pension Wealth
 15 
 
 
Scenario 3 
It appears that retirement preparation is significantly lower for future retirees compared to 
those retired in 2009-2013.  Thus, the future fiscal costs are likely to be substantially greater 
than calculated in Scenario 2. 
It is assumed that the negative annual growth rates of net asset accumulation for each quintile 
estimated in Table 9 describe both past and future trends.  That is, the -6.12%, -1.94%, etc. 
estimates are assumed to be the same over the entire relevant period of preretirement asset 
accumulation.  It is also assumed that the cumulative percentage changes will ultimately create 
proportionate impacts on retirement incomes.  That is, if the cumulative percentage change in 
assets is X%, then retirement income also changes by X%.  Although this proportionate 
assumption might be somewhat problematic for upper-income households, it should be 
reasonable for lower-income households, which is the relevant subpopulation for most of the 
fiscal costs.  The proportionate relationship between retirement assets and retirement income 
is also assumed to hold across states (i.e., the relationship does not vary across states). 
The relevant cumulative percentage changes are determined by the age difference between 
those observed in the 2009-2013 CPS data on retirement income and public assistance and 
those turning age 65 between 2018 and 2032.  The age 65 -79 cohort observed in the 2009-
Table 9
Estimated Effects on Net Wealth including Pensions (for Ages 47 - 61 in 2016 $)
Ist Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile
Age $952 $1,088 $2,088 $3,542 $919
3.49 5.05 6.38 6.21 0.09
DJIA $5 $9 $18 $27 $92
13.68 29.61 36.69 33.88 5.44
Year -$3,826 -$4,209 -$3,792 -$2,687 -$1,526
-16.52 -22.81 -13.43 -5.56 -0.18
N 7,431 7,520 7,536 7,554 7,563
Mean Net Wealth $62,484 $216,518 $416,582 $716,456 $2,051,633
Growth Rate -6.12% -1.94% -0.91% -0.38% -0.07%
t statistics in italtics
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2013 CPS data average about 14 years ahead of the cohort turning 65 in 2018.24  Thus, the 
cumulative percentage changes are the estimated annual growth rates compounded over 14 
years for the 2018 cohort, 15 years for the 2019 cohort, etc. 
These cumulative percentage changes are applied to mean retirement income in each quintile.  
For example, the mean retirement income for the bottom quintile in the CPS data was $4,701, 
which is projected to shrink to $2,069 for the bottom quintile turning age 65 in 2018.  The mean 
retirement income for the second quintile is $13,730, and it is projected to shrink to $10,642 
for the second quintile turning age 65 in 2018.  Etc. 
The estimated relationship between means-tested transfer payments and retirement income 
for each quintile shown in Figure 1 and the estimated numbers of new 65-year-olds shown in 
Table 4 are then combined with the estimated changes in retirement incomes for each quintile.  
This yields an estimate of the additional public assistance created by falling saving for 
retirement.  Adding these additional costs to the Scenario 2 estimates yields a third scenario. 
Table 10 reports the Scenario 3 estimates.  These are the most-likely estimates of the fiscal 
costs associated with future retirees.  The national cost of public assistance on the retirement-
age population is projected to exceed $86 billion by 2032, which is nearly 2.4 times higher than 
in 2016.  The fiscal cost in Maine is almost $362 million in 2032, and Maine’s share is $61 
million, which is more than 2.2 times greater than in 2016. 
                                                          
24 The middle of the age cohort is age 72 (i.e., 7 years ahead), and middle year of the data is 2011 (also 7 years 
ahead). 
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Counterfactual Scenarios 
Two simple counterfactual scenarios are explored to illustrate the likely fiscal savings in the 
future if more preretirement Americans were better financially prepared for retirement. 
Table 11 shows illustrative fiscal implications from reversing the recent decline in asset 
accumulation among preretirement Americans.  The difference between Scenario 2 and 
Scenario 3 is created by the significant decline in net worth in the lower half of the wealth 
distribution.  Table 11 reports the estimated difference in projected spending on public 
assistance caused by this phenomenon.  Or, how much taxpayers would save if the trend in 
asset accumulation were reversed. 
If the decline in asset accumulation were reversed, the projected national fiscal savings would 
exceed $21 billion by 2032. The projected fiscal savings in Maine would be nearly $89 million in 
2032.  Moreover, these fiscal effects would not be the result of an ambitious program for 
increasing retirement savings.  These effects would be the result of just retirement savings not 
declining. 
A second illustrative counterfactual scenario is shown in Table 12.  This table shows the fiscal 
effects per $1,000 of retirement income for the lowest two quintiles.  The fiscal effects are 
heavily concentrated in the bottom 40% of the retirement income distribution.  Nationally, 90% 
(86% in Maine) of the fiscal costs in Scenario 3 come from the bottom two quintiles.  Thus, this 
scenario essentially highlights the marginal impact of retirement income on costs to taxpayers. 
Table 10
Estimated Fiscal Costs from New Retirees (in 2016 $) - Scenario 3
Total Cost to Total Cost to
Year Cost States Cost Maine Govt.
2018 $4,727,301,571 $1,117,173,921 $21,236,635 $3,599,714
2019 $9,697,150,906 $2,291,667,655 $44,067,508 $7,469,659
2020 $14,930,627,266 $3,528,462,731 $66,991,083 $11,355,317
2021 $20,399,802,301 $4,820,959,017 $90,440,387 $15,330,089
2022 $26,115,113,133 $6,171,623,051 $115,984,726 $19,659,980
2023 $31,972,518,709 $7,555,867,458 $141,296,504 $23,950,450
2024 $37,911,501,387 $8,959,390,476 $167,269,306 $28,352,967
2025 $43,985,533,648 $10,394,828,926 $193,521,295 $32,802,808
2026 $50,233,894,621 $11,871,465,401 $218,641,158 $37,060,748
2027 $56,476,415,397 $13,346,721,699 $244,575,228 $41,456,700
2028 $62,772,344,066 $14,834,599,554 $269,878,612 $45,745,748
2029 $69,058,496,552 $16,320,167,064 $294,107,532 $49,852,668
2030 $75,150,378,111 $17,759,823,728 $317,375,244 $53,796,660
2031 $80,897,298,810 $19,117,957,927 $338,932,927 $57,450,793
2032 $86,425,799,580 $20,424,474,296 $361,599,782 $61,292,936
United States Maine
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Table 11
Estimated Annual Fiscal Savings if the Decline in Retirement Savings were Reversed (in 2016 $)
Total Cost to Total Cost to
Year Cost States Cost Maine Govt.
2018 -$961,555,235 -$227,238,397 -$4,272,962 -$724,288
2019 -$2,029,910,293 -$479,716,136 -$9,126,258 -$1,546,946
2020 -$3,205,219,429 -$757,469,669 -$14,229,738 -$2,412,010
2021 -$4,477,517,846 -$1,058,144,080 -$19,644,106 -$3,329,772
2022 -$5,845,085,220 -$1,381,332,813 -$25,693,097 -$4,355,106
2023 -$7,280,495,441 -$1,720,554,426 -$31,848,618 -$5,398,497
2024 -$8,765,084,565 -$2,071,398,185 -$38,285,574 -$6,489,592
2025 -$10,306,509,516 -$2,435,673,604 -$44,897,634 -$7,610,369
2026 -$11,910,100,502 -$2,814,640,336 -$51,333,778 -$8,701,327
2027 -$13,529,294,025 -$3,197,294,319 -$58,027,484 -$9,835,943
2028 -$15,174,021,760 -$3,585,982,645 -$64,621,269 -$10,953,622
2029 -$16,825,294,688 -$3,976,217,756 -$70,988,616 -$12,032,918
2030 -$18,434,262,281 -$4,356,455,109 -$77,137,940 -$13,075,259
2031 -$19,959,725,690 -$4,716,958,435 -$82,870,360 -$14,046,932
2032 -$21,429,051,922 -$5,064,195,209 -$88,862,460 -$15,062,623
United States Maine
Table 12
Estimated Annual Fiscal Savings if Retirement Incomes of the Bottom Two Quintiles were $1,000 Greater (in 2016 $)
United States Maine
Total Cost to Total Cost to
Year Cost States Cost Maine Govt.
2018 -$280,124,989 -$66,200,205 -$1,200,346 -$203,465
2019 -$561,785,771 -$132,763,354 -$2,435,319 -$412,798
2020 -$846,233,964 -$199,985,235 -$3,622,130 -$613,969
2021 -$1,131,875,670 -$267,489,172 -$4,787,288 -$811,469
2022 -$1,419,314,190 -$335,417,738 -$6,013,917 -$1,019,388
2023 -$1,702,988,548 -$402,456,743 -$7,180,392 -$1,217,112
2024 -$1,980,026,821 -$467,927,483 -$8,335,019 -$1,412,826
2025 -$2,253,596,983 -$532,578,627 -$9,459,985 -$1,603,514
2026 -$2,525,899,714 -$596,930,246 -$10,489,346 -$1,777,996
2027 -$2,788,126,772 -$658,900,743 -$11,520,045 -$1,952,704
2028 -$3,043,693,762 -$719,297,308 -$12,485,149 -$2,116,294
2029 -$3,289,931,149 -$777,489,066 -$13,367,872 -$2,265,920
2030 -$3,518,661,533 -$831,543,502 -$14,177,419 -$2,403,142
2031 -$3,723,805,752 -$880,023,965 -$14,884,481 -$2,522,992
2032 -$3,912,229,664 -$924,553,022 -$15,615,756 -$2,646,947
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Nationally, an additional $1,000 in retirement income would raise average retirement income 
by 20% for the first quintile, and 7% for the second quintile.  It would lead to more than $3.9 
billion in fiscal savings by 2032.  An additional $1,000 in retirement income in Maine would 
raise average retirement income by 16% for the first quintile, and 7% for the second quintile.  It 
would create $15.6 million in fiscal savings in 2032. 
 
